Right. As I see it, this comes down to ones views on the nature of consciousness, which is essentially a religious question, and we ought not go there.
It is essentially a philosophical question, and only a religious one depending on one's metaphysical position. But you're right, it's not only a can of worms, it's THE can of worms. They don't call it "The Hard Problem" for nothing.
In response to the question, I don't think any of us could stop being human, because if we stopped being human, we would no longer be "us". I cannot become a robot. "I" would cease to be, and a robot would take my place. Even if the robots could behave as if they were human, there is no way to know if they possessed anything like consciousness as we understand it, or whether they might be http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/.
So, no, I would not give up being human. I know what it is to be human. I have no idea of the qualities of the phenomenological experience of being a robot (or even if robots are capable of having phenomenological experience at all). The only way to know is to experience it first hand, and that's a one-way street.
Also if there is an artificial brain I would want my consciousness transferred. I would not want to have to die to make an exact robot replica of me, that would defeat the purpose.
Ah, but that is the fundamental problem. Is the "transfer" of consciousness from one brain to another possible? Does the idea of transferring consciousness even make sense?
Consider this scenario. We have a machine that can "transfer" your consciousness from your organic brain to a synthetic brain. Let's assume that the process ends with your organic brain being melted into goo after your consciousness has been transferred to the synthetic brain.
In your new robot body with synthetic brain, you wake up and say, "I'm Cabius, and it's great to be a robot!"
Now, suppose the machine malfunctioned and your original organic brain was not destroyed. It wakes up in your original organic body and says, "Wait, I'm Cabius, and I'm still human."
They can't both be you, and it seems self-evident that the organic you, with your original brain, is the real you (it was the real you before you entered the machine, after all). The "transferred" consciousness, if it even exists, cannot be you. Inasmuch as you are your consciousness, there can be only one of you. A consciousness separate from your own phenomenological experience is, by definition, not you.
I would argue that consciousness, by it's very nature, cannot be transferred. Consciousness is not an object. It is not physical. We humans have been attempting to objectify consciousness since the beginning of human thought, and it has only led us around in circles.